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Abstract 
Why members are organizational activists has received little attention, despite its obvious 
importance for many associations. In this analysis, a theory of experiential search is applied to the 
activist decision calculus of Common Cause members. Most such volunteers join an organization as . 
members of the rank and file, learn about the group and its operations, and then decide to become 
activists. They are largely motivated by what they learn about those benefits that accrue exclusively 
to activists. Their actions also may suggest a tendency toward organizational oligarchy-but one 
that is strongly tempered by the presence of other factors shaping the conditional decision calculus. 
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Introduction: Organizational Maintenance, Internal Democracy, and Member Activism 
Member activism is a key to political success-and to organizational survival-for a myriad 
of interest groups. It is especially vital for organizations lacking a large financial base, like the vast 
majority of public interest groups. But almost all leaders who wish to sustain their associations must 
pay attention to the decision-making calculus motivating activists. An inability to mobilize 
members in the hinterlands will mitigate a group's influence over public policy: No matter how 
sophisticated a Washington lobbying operation, without a base of support in congressional districts 
an organization is likely to be frustrated in achieving its policy goals (Kingdon 1981). 
What prompts activism also has implications for internal democracy. It is often asserted that 
the "iron law of oligarchy" (Michels 1966) creates inherently conservative organizations. 
Associational goals are obscured by institutionalization as organizational leaders increasingly 
monopolize the decision-making process. Yet this proposition has been disputed because of the 
discovery of groups that exhibit higher levels of internal democracy than the Michelian hypothesis 
would lead one to expect (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Determining what motivates activists and 
how they view their organizations can help reconcile these discrepancies. 
Why members choose to be activists is poorly understood. Data on the correlates of 
volunteerism (i.e., activism) in political parties exist, but the results are largely inconclusive (for a 
survey, see Eldersveld 1982). Despite the obvious importance of activism, students of group 
participation have devoted little time to explaining it. 
This omission may seem surprising. It undoubtedly stems, however, from the difficulty of 
acquiring data to test theoretical propositions. Studying activism requires both an understanding of 
why members choose it over alternative paths-i.e., an integrated theoretical perspective from which 
joining, quitting, activism, and other choices are comprehensible-and infonnation on a sufficient 
number of activists to permit a thorough analysis. Analyzing the latter, in turn, frequently presents 
methodological problems that necessitate the utilization of complicated econometric techniques. 
Only with an integrated theoretical perspective and a rich data source can activists be 
compared to other group members and specific hypotheses about alternative motivations for activism 
be tested. More generally, two different motivations might precipitate contributors to move up the 
organizational hierarchy and become activists. One obvious scenario is that members make such a 
commitment because they are passionately devoted to the group's ideals. This is certainly the 
popular image of activists in public regarding groups. In their study of party activists, Abramowitz 
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and Stone (1984) label this the purist model. An alternative, more in the spirit of narrower, utility­
maximizing models such as Olson's (1965) and Moe's (1980), is that benefits accruing exclusively 
to activists drive some to participate. Even if individuals do join an organization for seemingly 
altruistic reasons, it might be argued that selfish motivations will separate activists from other 
contributors because of the quantum leap in the cost of activism relative to simply joining. 
This research provides the basis for examining activism and distinguishing between these 
two scenarios in a group for which it is crucial: Common Cause (for a detailed associational case 
study, see McFarland 1984). This organization is the most prominent of the consumer groups that 
burgeoned in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its political agenda has focused on "good government" 
issues such as regulation of lobbyists, campaign financing, sunshine laws, and ethics legislation. It 
relies on "insider-outsider" lobbying (McFarland 1984) by employing professional Washington 
representatives in conjunction with voluntary networks in over 300 congressional districts. In 
addition to its national organization, state associations have proliferated to fight similar battles at the 
subnational level. 
In late 1981, over 1,200 Common Cause members responded to a mail questionnaire.1 A 
stratified design oversampled Common Cause-designated activists. Three hundred of these 
members, who provide leadership for congressional or state organizations, responded; and more than 
100 others reported engaging in lesser activist behavior. Contributors were queried about a variety 
of concerns: membership and its benefits, personal attitudes, previous history in Common Cause, 
and the internal politics of the organization, to name a few. These data permit a rare opportunity to 
analyze the activist decision conditional upon membership. 
This research unfolds in three steps. The first part of this analysis specifies an experiential 
search theory of member behavior. This model is then tested to determine its utility for 
understanding the conditional activism choice. The final section of this research presents 
conclusions about activism and its consequences for decision-making by individual members and for 
organizational democracy. 
Theoretical Perspectives: Activism and Experiential Search 
The experiential search perspective has been introduced elsewhere (Rothenberg 1987). It 
builds on the work of Olson (1965), Wilson (1962, 1973; see also Clark and Wilson 1961) and Moe 
(1980), among others, and incorporates realistic assumptions about imperfect information.2 What 
differentiates this framework from the others is the explicit assumption that decision-makers learn 
through experience, e.g., by joining an organization. They are assumed to be aware of their 
informational shortfalls and to take them into account in making choices. They recognize that 
acquiring information is costly and strive to become knowledgeable efficiently. If the price of 
learning through experience is small and a mistake is easily rectified, experiential search can be the 
optimal strategy. 
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Membership and activism in groups provide an especially likely environment for 
experiential search, since many relevant organizational attributes are specific characteristics, which 
are observable only by participating, and not general characteristics, which can be viewed without 
joining. When evaluating specific qualities is relatively cheap, prospective contributors will tend, 
ceteris paribus, to join, accumulate knowledge, and then decide whether to learn more through 
continued participation. Since a reasonable assumption is that one accumulates knowledge more and 
more slowly over time, the effect of experience on members' decision calculi should diminish 
temporally. 
Activism is a good deal more expensive than joining, so many contributors will choose to 
learn about it while remaining in the rank and file. Others may opt to engage in a limited amount of 
activist behavior to gain valuable experience, and then decide whether or not to advance to a higher 
level of activism. 
When they sign up, first-time joiners have a poor idea about what it means to be either a 
member or an activist. Over time, they will learn about the costs and benefits of each and behave 
accordingly. Costs may be pecuniary or nonpecuniary. Following previous research (e.g., Clark and 
Wilson 1961, Wilson 1973, Moe 1980), three types of benefits are distinguished: selective, solidary, 
and purposive. Selective benefits are tangible returns that have monetary values and are derived from 
contributions. They either may be divisible, private rewards or may emanate from members' 
impacts on the level of collective goods provided to everyone. Solidary benefits stem from 
associational interactions, while purposive benefits are intangible rewards garnered from contributing 
to the group because of its stated goals. In truth, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between 
purposive and collective rewards in large groups; what differentiates them is probably how much 
contributors know about the organization and its impact (Rothenberg 1987). 
In a world of perfect information or one where imperfectly informed contributors never 
learn, most members will be either activists or nonactivists from the time they join. Only exogenous 
shocks might motivate a change in their status in subsequent periods. The initial intention to be an 
activist-assuming it is accurately measured-would be the principal explanator of the level of 
involvement. 
If organizational experience matters, only those with very high estimates of the benefits of 
volunteerism join with the immediate intention of becoming an activist. Other contributors should 
initially opt for a rank-and-file position (with its lesser associated costs), learn what membership and 
activism offer, and then decide whether to become more involved. 
Experience will improve individuals' ability to evaluate the pros and cons of being an active 
versus a passive member. Members will discover that the costs of activism are different from those 
of rank-and-file status. The price of simply joining is largely monetary, whereas activism primarily 
entails time commitments. While the one thing known with certainty before signing up is the dues 
level, potential activists may be quite uncertain about the costs of greater involvement. 
Organizational members will also learn whether some divisible, selective benefits are 
reserved for activists. These benefits must be denied to the rank and file to be a motivating force for 
activism, just as returns must be denied to noncontributors to encourage membership. Because 
divisible rewards usually accrue to all members, such benefits will play a lesser role in precipitating 
activism than in stimulating membership unless leaders create a multitiered hierarchy with 
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corresponding privileges. 
A few selective rewards may simply be by-products of volunteering. Most notably, activism 
can be a channel for personal advancement (Schlesinger 1966, Eldersveld 1982). Organizational 
membership by itself will be a poor vehicle for the upwardly mobile; activism should be an essential 
ingredient. 
Contributions to collective goods may be a strong factor in precipitating activism even in 
large groups. In the standard Downsian (1957) decision calculus, such motivations have two facets: 
the probability of having an impact and the resulting benefits given an impact. Members may 
contribute their time and energies if they feel that they, either individually or jointly with other 
group members, can influence the production of collective goods or if they highly value the benefits 
being produced. 3 
Learning about collective goods should have two corresponding elements. Members will 
discover whether they can have an impact. This assessment can be a function of a number of factors: 
whether they feel efficacious within the larger political system and whether they feel efficacious 
within the group, for example. These components will largely be learned over time. 
They will also arrive at conclusions about how much they value the benefits that the group 
produces. Even if they know before joining what concerns are on the association's agenda, new 
members are frequently ignorant about the organization's positions on those issues (Rothenberg 
1987). Over time, they will determine how much they value these collective benefits. 
Members will gather additional information about whether the organization makes the 
proper purposive statement and matches their broad policy preferences. This evaluation, combined 
with how strongly they are motivated by purposive incentives, might stimulate activism. However, 
such returns may be less germane in precipitating activism than in stimulating initial membership, 
since many of the rewards will be reaped by joining. 
Conversely, activism should be especially important for those who value rewarding 
interactions. Members desiring solidary returns-or who find them a pleasant by-product of 
contributing-will discover whether the association offers what they are seeking. If it does not, they 
are likely to leave (Rothenberg 1987); if it does, they should be prone to become activists. 
This discussion of the costs and benefits of volunteerism underscores the relevance of 
organizational experience. Individuals will enlist in groups intent on overcoming informational 
deficiencies. A few will immediately become activists, but others will only join the cadre later on. 
The impact of experiential learning will reflect diminishing marginal returns. After a certain period, 
the additional effect of another year in the organization for contributors who remain in the rank and 
file is likely to be quite small. 
One specific piece of information about the organization that would seem particularly 
relevant for the activist choice is whether members judge the group to be oligarchic. Perceptions of 
oligarchy might have either of two opposite effects for those remaining in the association. Members 
may think more poorly of the group and be unwilling to make the commitment that activism 
entails-and either stay in the rank and file or leave the association altogether-or they may 
determine that accomplishing anything within the organizational context requires getting intimately 
involved in its politics. 
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To summarize: The conditional activism choice is hypothesized to be a decision process in 
which members join, update their information, and decide whether they prefer to remain in the rank 
and file, join the activist core, or leave the organization. The conditional decision to be an activist 
(i.e., once one is a member) should be structured by one's initial intention upon joining and whether 
one plans to learn about activism by volunteering or as a member of the rank and file; the 
opportunity cost of activism relative to passive membership; the additional divisible, collective, 
purposive, and solidary benefits accruing from activism; the effect of learning; and perceptions of 
oligarchy. 
An Empirical Test: Common Cause, Activism, and Experiential Search 
It is posited here that activism is a rational response by imperfectly informed decision­
makers who determine that its net benefits are positive. The cross-sectional hypotheses4 that can be 
tested with data on Common Cause members can be classified in three categories: One pertains to 
premembership intentions toward activism; a second, to its costs and benefits; and a third, to 
organizational experience. Findings for the first two can possibly be reconciled with alternative 
theoretical frameworks, such as those based on assumptions of perfect information or bounded 
rationality; the third unambiguously distinguishes the experiential search hypothesis. 
· An initial experiential search hypothesis is that while a premembership disposition might be 
relevant for activism, its importance ought to be overshadowed by what contributors learn. A second 
set of hypotheses is that (a) the varying costs of organizational activism will be important 
determinants of activism; (b) although divisible benefits exclusive to activists could be germane, 
they will be unimportant �elative to other factors because few will exist, unless the leadership makes 
a concerted effort to produce them; and (c) purposive benefits will be of overriding importance if 
members are strongly driven by purist tendencies; otherwise purposive rewards will be of minimal 
consequence, solidary benefits will be very germane, and collective rewards will fall somewhere in 
between. The third group of hypotheses is directly related to experiential search: (a) Descriptively, 
activists will take considerable time after joining the organization to get involved; (b) organizational 
experience will be extremely relevant; (c) the impact of experience will exhibit a pattern of 
diminishing marginal returns; and (d) the overall predictions from the model will display a similar 
pattern of diminishing marginal returns. 
This empirical analysis of activism proceeds in two steps. The first surveys the costs and 
benefits of activism in Common Cause to provide the proper context for explaining this decision. 
The second tests hypotheses about why members volunteer their time and energy. 
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Being an Activist at Common Cause 
Activists are essential for Common Cause to be successful. Organizational maintenance has 
a variety of prerequisites: recruitment and retention of members, fund raising, production of 
publications, oversight of state and local organizations, development of issue positions, a host of 
administrative duties, and fighting political battles . These tasks cannot all be perfonned by Common 
Cause employees.  In mid-1987, the organization had a small, if professional, staff of around 80 to 
manage a group with more than 300,000 members. 
While volunteers perfonn a myriad of tasks, their most important role is mobilizing 
Common Cause members for transmitting the direction and intensity of the rank and file's 
preferences to political decision-makers, usually through letter writing. The organization has 
developed an intricate, congressional district-based, grassroots lobbying network, which is arguably 
its most valuable resource in influencing public policy. (Almost every state also has a lobbying 
system.) Political success hinges on the efforts of unpaid personnel. 
Headquarter volunteers regularly keep in contact over the telephone with congressional 
district coordinators and other leaders of the local organizations. Several times a year, all district 
coordinators are asked to mobilize the participants in the complete local telephone chains; many 
other times, subsets of the association-networks in specific congressional districts or all activists, 
for example-are asked to get involved. 
This description suggests that Common Cause has three classes of members. The rank and 
file, which constitute 85 percent of the membership, contribute money and may be the objects of 
mobilization efforts (for example, 27 percent reported that they had been contacted in the last year 
through Common Cause to write their senators or congressmen). Core activists are the 4 percent of 
members who are leaders of local congressional or state organizations (McFarland 1984); these are 
the Common Cause-designated activists who are overrepresented in the stratified sample. The 
remaining 1 1  percent are occasional activists, who are not part of the leadership group but engage in 
what would be considered activist behavior. They may be involved in their congressional district or 
state organizations or perfonn a variety of other tasks. 5 
What are the costs and benefits of being an activist? The costs are the time devoted to the 
organization and to dealing with requests for it : The occasional activist reports spending slightly 
less than four hours per month; the core activist, more than eight. These substantial costs should 
lead many to learn experientially in the rank and file before committing themselves. 
Conditioning factors might make this price less burdensome for some. Those with higher 
wages may find devoting time to an unpaid political position less attractive due to greater 
opportunity  costs. 6 Similarly, the relative price of volunteering at Common Cause rather than being 
active in alternative groups might vary because of the specific responsibilities involved. Most 
notably, activism in Common Cause primarily entails telephoning and letter writing. For 
geographically isolated individuals, volunteering at Common Cause will be easier than in 
associations where direct interactions are more integral. 
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As mentioned at the outset of this analysis, two scenarios of the factors that motivate 
Common Cause activism can be outlined. One is that benefits from activism-particularly in a 
public regarding group such as Common Cause-stem from member passion and devotion to 
associational ideals. This process would be reflected in a high valuation either of what are 
traditionally labelled purposive rewards or of collective returns concerning what the organization 
tries to achieve, rather than how effective it is. 
An alternative possibility is that more selfish rewards, broadly defined, are key. Individuals 
are activists because they believe that they or the group are especially effective in producing 
collective goods or because they think that the association offers valuable divisible and solidary 
benefits exclusively to activists. 
At Common Cause, no formal perquisites are furnished exclusively to activists, although 
volunteers may believe their involvement will advance them up the political opportunity structure. 
While some political aspirants become dissatisfied with Common Cause and quit altogether, others 
move up the organizational hierarchy to better themselves.7 Activists are an ambitious lot: 31  
percent of  core activists and 24 percent of occasional activists report that they would like to hold a 
political party position, public elective office, or public appointive office, as compared to only 18 
percent of the rank and file. Still, in the overall scheme of things, divisible rewards ought to be 
relatively unimportant in the activist calculus. 
Collective rewards from activism are potentially much more important. Members who see 
themselves or the organization as having a substantial impact on the amount of collective goods 
produced or who highly value these goods may be considerably more active. 
However, solidary returns ought to be the strongest motivating force. Interpersonal 
interactions are perhaps the key distinguishing feature between being an activist and belonging to the 
rank and file. Solidary benefits are undoubtedly less important for Common Cause than for 
organizations such as the League of Women Voters that rely more heavily on face-to-face 
interactions. Some Common Cause members will find that the organization does not offer the type 
of interaction they are seeking, since much of its business is transacted over the telephone. But 
others will discover that the opportunities for solidary rewards match their preferences. 
The entire discussion of the costs and benefits of being a Common Cause activist highlights 
the relevance of experience for determining whether to become an activist if individuals are 
imperfectly informed but able to learn. The impact of information updating should be especially 
great if activists are principally motivated by factors other than broad purposive returns. A very few 
will immediately volunteer; some will join, like what they learn, and become part of the core of 
activists; others will opt to get involved but to a lesser degree; and most will remain in the-rank-and 
file. The impact of experience should diminish with time; rank-and-file or activist status will 
gradually become less malleable. 
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Examining the Conditional Activism Decision 
Common Cause members join an organization about which they are largely uninformed 
(Rothenberg 1987), and most exhibit little inclination to be active. In a stratified sample in which 31 
percent of the respondents are either core or occasional activists, only 1 1  percent claim that the 
opportunity for participation was a principal reason for joining. 8 Of this 1 1  percent, only 47 percent 
are activists ( 1 3  percent are occasional activists; 34 percent are core activists). Whether the 
remaining 53 percent are former activists who returned to the rank and file is unknown, but 83 
percent of all activists did give other reasons for initially joining. 
These data are inconsistent with either perspectives based on perfect information or those 
grounded on assumptions of imperfect information where contributors fail to learn. Is there an 
alternative means of conceptualizing membership decision-making that can reconcile this 
discrepancy between initial intentions and activist behavior? 
The answer advanced here is affirmative and centers on the belief that experience is the key: 
The average activist minimally takes three years after becoming a member to graduate to activism; 
only 16 percent become activists within one year of joining. 9 Twenty-two percent of the latter 
claimed that the opportunity for participation was of principal importance in deciding to join 
Common Cause, compared to only 14 percent of those taking more than a year. These findings 
confirm the descriptive experiential search hypothesis that future activists will take their time getting 
involved. More convincing evidence for the importance of experience requires estimation. 
Measurement 
Conditional activism is measured trichotomously: Rank-and-file members are scored zero; 
occasional activists, one; and core activists, two. 
The factors posited to structure a member's decision calculus are as follows: 
( 1) The premembership disposition for activism is measured by a dummy variable indicating 
whether members cited the ability to participate as a principal reason for joining in response to 
the previously discussed, open-ended question. 
(2) Costs are gauged by the financial sacrifices of devoting time to activism, measured by family 
income, and by the comparative cost of being an activist at Common Cause relative to other 
public interest groups, tapped by the percentage of a respondent's congressional district that is 
urban.10 
(3) Divisible benefits are measured by a dummy variable tapping whether or not members have 
political aspirations. 
(4) Collective benefits are gauged by whether respondents (a) agree with the position of Common 
Cause on key issues; (b) consider the leadership effective in providing collective goods; (c) 
believe they are efficacious within the group; and (d) think that they are efficacious vis-a-vis the 
larger political system.11 
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(5) Purposive benefits are tapped by whether respondents feel an obligation as good citizens to 
participate and whether they care about the group.12 
(6) Solidary benefits are measured by whether members value the interpersonal interactions 
Common Cause provides.13 
(7) Learning is measured by organizational experience, operationalized to capture the hypothesis of 
diminishing marginal returns with both a logarithmic and a linear term of the number of years 
in the organization. Incorporating logarithmic and linear terms is a standard means of 
measuring diminishing marginal returns (e.g., Maddala 1977). 
Organizational experience acts as a surrogate for the respondents' level of information and 
their knowledge about a host of factors, which is correlated with time. Members gradually 
learn how a group functions and slowly develop an understanding of its issue positions 
(Rothenberg 1987). They should also become more certain about the value of the many 
benefits the association offers. A big advantage to employing years in the organization as a 
measure of experience is that it is continuous, which makes it feasible to test the hypothesis of 
diminishing marginal returns. 
(8) Perceptions of oligarchy are indicated by whether contributors believe that most members have 
little role in the group's internal politics.14 [This measure is not the sole indication of whether 
the organization may be oligarchic: If motivations for activism include self-aggrandizement by 
obtaining divisible benefits and enjoying solidary rewards, then leaders have a situation that is 
ripe for obscuring associational goals in the Michelian sense.] 
Examination of the intercorrelations among the independent variables reveals no evidence of 
multicollinearity. Predictions about each factor are straightforward, with two exceptions: The 
impact of costs should be negative; the influence of all types of benefits, the initial disposition for 
activism, and the logarithmic learning term should be positive; there are no preconceptions regarding 
the linear learning term or perceptions about oligarchy.15 
As mentioned previously, another expectation is that the premembership disposition for 
activism, if properly measured, would be a crucial test of any model that does not incorporate 
learning. However, especially since it is known a priori that only a small fraction of activists 
actually gave such responses, it might seem that a straw man is being set up; other benefits might 
also be reflecting initial intentions. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that if either individuals 
fail to learn or learning is not important, premembership disposition should be quite important and 
organizational experience should be inconsequential. 
A final expectation stems from the entire model. Overall predictions should exhibit a 
pattern of diminishing marginal returns: The predicted probability of being either an occasional or a 
core- activist will increase with experience but at a diminishing rate. 
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Estimation: Dealing with Choice-Based Samples 
This model cannot be estimated with standard techniques for analyzing limited dependent 
variables because the sample is endogenous to the choice being studied. A random sample the size 
of the Common Cause survey would contain, on average, about 1,050 rank-and-file members, 135 
occasional activists, and 50 core activists. The stratified sample yields a six-fold overrepresentation 
of core activists and a 20 percent underrepresentation of occasional activists and rank-and-file 
contributors. Any model that is estimated without adjusting for this fact will produce inconsistent 
estimates. 
The solution to this problem lies in the use of choice-based probability models (for surveys, 
see Maddala 1983, Amemiya 1985, Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The weighted exogenous sample 
maximum likelihood function (WESML) proposed by Manski and Lerman ( 1977) in particular is 
appropriate because the actual probability that an individual belongs to Common Cause is known.16
The intuition behind the Manski/Lerman solution is straightforward. If both the real world 
proportions of the groups in the sample [(Q(i)] and the sample proportions [H(i)] are known-which
they clearly are in this case-the sample can be treated as if it were exogenously selected, except 
that each observation should be weighted by Q(i)/H(i). Besides this weighting, the maximization of 
the WESML function is identical to that of an exogenously chosen sample. In a random sample, 
Q(i)/H(i) equals one; in others, underrepresented choices are more heavily weighted. The derived 
coefficients are not generally asymptotically efficient, but they are consistent; this makes WESML a 
very satisfactory solution in reasonably large samples. 
More formally, for each i e C , where C is the choice set, it is possible to define the function
w(i) by w(i) = Q(i)/H(i). Assuming Q(i) is known and H(i) can be calculated directly from the data,
w (i) is known. Consider then the weighted exogenous sampling likelihood function
N N 
WN(y,9)= L w(in)logP(in,zn,9)+ L w(in)logg(zn),n=l n=l 
where Zn is a vector of attributes, 9 is a parameter vector, and y = (in, zn ). It is possible (although
complicated) to show that ( 1) yields coefficients that are strongly consistent and asymptotically 
normal. The resulting covariance matrix is 
V = .a-1Ml-1 , where
.0= [-E[ o2w(i)logP(i,z,9)] l a9a9' 0• • 
Li= [ E[ ow(i)logP(i,z,9)] [ ow(i)log�(i,z,9)] 
] .
a9 0• o9 0• 
(1) 
(2) 
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and the expectations E operate over i and z with respect to the distribution given by Ac (z Ii )H(i ), 
where Ac (z Ii) is the likelihood of drawing z conditioned on drawing a decision-maker who has 
selected i. 
The cost of utilizing the WESML estimator for studying activist behavior is that taking 
advantage of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable is currently beyond the available 
technology. Econometricians have failed to develop an ordered WESML estimator. Activism is 
necessarily treated as if it were measured nominally, and the resulting confusion from utilizing two 
sets of coefficients as well as the loss of information must be tolerated.17 
Results 
The WESML estimates of the experiential search model comparing occasional and group 
activists to the rank and file are shown in Table 1, while information about the relative impact of 
each factor is displayed in Table 2.18 These results demonstrate both that the model does a good job 
of explaining activism and that the relative impacts of the various factors are consistent with the 
predictions. Strong support is provided for the experiential search perspective and for the inference 
that members are searching over personal returns. The results are stronger for core than for 
occasional activists; this finding undoubtedly reflects both that more core activists were surveyed 
and that being a core activist requires a greater commitment. 
(Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
As expected when the average activist takes three years to get involved, the initial propensity 
for participation is a highly imperfect predictor.19 Although such predispositions are significant for 
core activists, there is no evidence that members either join with perfect information or never learn 
about the value of activism. Group members who were inclined to volunteer are only 1.5 percent 
more likely actually to be activists. 
It may be that there are two types of activists: those believing that the net benefits of 
activism are sufficiently high that they volunteer immediately and learn as activists, and those who 
will only volunteer after acquiring experience in the rank and file. A priori intentions should 
translate more directly into activism for the former group. With this in mind, the experiential search 
model was rerun on a dichotomous variable scored one if activists chose that option in a year or less 
(107, or 37 percent of the 298 activists) and zero if they took more time. The results (not shown) 
reveal few differences between those becoming activists immediately and those taking more time, 
but there is some indication that belief in participation makes more of a difference for the former 
(t = 1.9). 
Costs of activism are important for all members. Contributors with greater opportunity costs 
are 1 .8 percent and 1.5 percent less likely to be core and occasional activists. Writing checks is one 
thing; making substantial time commitments is another. Being from an urban area-where it is 
easier to substitute other groups for Common Cause as a means for volunteerism-is also negatively 
related to the choice to get involved for some activists. Isolated, rural areas produce Common Cause 
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Table 1. Determinants of Activism 
(WESML Estimates) 
Variable 
Constant 
Reason for Joining 
Belief in Participation 
Costs 
Opportunity Cost 
Urban Residence 
Divisible Benefits 
Political Aspirant 
Collective Benefits 
Agreement with Group's Positions 
Assessment of Leadership's Achievements 
Feel Efficacious re: Group 
Feel Efficacious re: Political System 
Purposive Benefits 
Citizen Duty 
Care about Group 
Solidary Benefits 
Value Interactions 
Learning 
Organizational Experience 
Ln Organizational Experience 
Perceptions of Oligarchy 
Internal Politics Oligarchic 
Number of Cases = 911 
-2xlog likelihood function = 930 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10 
Occasional Activist 
-11.285*** 
0.543 
-0.191 *** 
0.711 
0.621* 
-0.004 
0.074 
0.230*** 
0.079 
0.110 
0.180*** 
0.524** 
-0.209 
1.792** 
-0.006 
Core Activist 
-11.407* 
0.704*** 
-0.196* 
-1.485* 
0.656*** 
0.008 
-.0.047 
0.392*** 
0.126*** 
0.008 
0.118*** 
0.842*** 
-0.275*** 
3.011 *** 
0.094 
Note: Weights for the WESML estimator are [ :�;� ] , [ :��� ] , and [ :�� ] for rank 
and file members, occasional activists, and core activists, respectively. Each set of 
coefficients reflects the comparison of that type of activist to the rank and file. All tests are 
one tailed except for those relating to the linear organizational experience measure and 
perceptions of oligarchy, about which there were no a priori predictions. 
13 
Table 2. Probability of Activism 
Variable 
Reason for Joining 
Belief in Participation 
Costs 
Opportunity Cost 
Urban Residence 
Divisible Benefits 
Political Aspirant 
Collective Benefits 
Agreement with Group's Positions 
Assessment of Leadership's Achievements 
Feel Efficacious re: Group 
Feel Efficacious re: Political System 
Purposive Benefits 
Citizen Duty 
Care about Group 
Solidary Benefits 
Value Interactions 
Learning 
Organizational Experience 
Ln Organizational Experience 
Perceptions of Oligarchy 
Internal Politics Oligarchic 
Percentage Change in Probability of Activism 
Occasional Activist Core Activist 
0.9 1.5 
-1.5 -1.8 
1.0 -1.3 
1.5 1.8 
-0.4 0.7 
0.5 -0.4 
1.5 4.4 
0.8 1.7 
1.2 0.0 
2.0 1.4 
1.4 3.0 
-2.7 -3.9 
6.1 23.1 
-0.1 1.2 
Note: Percentages are changes in the probability of being an activist assuming (1) an increase of 
one standard deviation from the mean of the variable in question and (2) all other 
independent variables are set at their respective means. 
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core activists in disproportionate numbers.20 
Activism also offers differential benefits for contributors. The one divisible return, political 
aspirations, stimulates voluntary behavior. Ambitious members who decide that Common Cause is a 
reasonable tool for advancing become activists. This result makes intuitive sense: Membership will 
only be a means of climbing the political opportunity structure for activists. Being in the rank and 
file will not facilitate contributors' careers. Nevertheless, because the group's leadership offers the 
same benefits to all contributors, the relative importance of divisible rewards for activism is small. 
Members with stronger political aspirations are only 1.5 percent and 1.8 percent more likely to be 
occasional and group activists. Still, the fact that aspirations have an impact provides some initial 
evidence that even in an organization like Common Cause, activists are motivated by narrow returns. 
The effect of collective returns on activism reveals an interesting dichotomy that buttresses 
this proposition. Benefits stemming from collective returns, as measured by issue agreement and 
leadership approval, are unimportant. These would presumably be the type of factors that would 
drive activists if they were purists. But the probability of affecting the production of collective 
goods, as tapped by feelings of efficacy toward the group and the political system, is gennane. 
Members with higher assessments of their associational and systemic efficacy are 1.5 percent and 0.8 
percent more likely to be occasional activists and 4.4 percent and 1.7 percent more likely to be core 
activists. When it comes to the impact of collective returns on activism, results are apparently more 
important than passion about the issues involved. 
The perception that mobilization is effective separates volunteers from the rank and file. 
While students of voting participation have debated whether the "p" in the decision calculus should 
be incorporated (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 1975), for organizational activism it is the inclusion of 
the "b" tenn that must be questioned.21 Activism reflects the belief that involvement in the hierarchy 
will get things done. 
These findings can be contrasted with Hirschman's ( 1970) supposition that members resort 
to voice as well as exit in reaction to deteriorating organizational perfonnance. Voice is relevant not 
for diminished perfonnance--as evidenced by the unimportance of assessments of leaders' job 
perfonnance--but for beliefs about whether a group delivers. Learning that an organization and the 
political system generally is responsive to the activists results in voice, i.e., adjusted perceptions of 
how the association operates can lead to voice. 
The results regarding broad purposive returns are not nearly as strong as the purist model 
would lead one to expect. This suggests that monetary contributions furnish virtually all of the 
purposive rewards deriving from membership in either the rank and file or activist cadre. It also 
reinforces the notion that activists are utility maximizers who adopt an efficient infonnation­
gathering strategy. Citizen duty is unimportant for separating out activists and members, although 
caring about group issues is relevant. 
Despite caveats specific to the Common Cause example, solidary benefits are strongly tied to 
activism for both occasional and core activists. If solidary rewards are central for promoting 
activism at Common Cause-which offers relatively few opportunities for face-to-face 
interactions-then they should be crucial for virtually any organization offering few divisible 
rewards exclusively to volunteers. 
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Specific costs and benefits still tell only part of the story: The effect of organizational 
experience looms large. An increase of three and one-half years of organizational experience 
increases the probabilities that the average member (who has been in the group more than seven 
years) will be an occasional or a core activist by 1.9 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively. 22 
Moreover, these numbers in some sense understate the effect of experience because the marginal 
returns associated with it diminish temporally. Members are more likely to participate over time, but 
if after a few years they are still in the rank and file, chances are they will remain there. 
A similar pattern of positive but diminishing marginal returns is found if the overall 
predicted probabilities of being either an occasional or a core activist are broken down by year 
(Figure 1). The likelihood of being either type increases with time, but the size of the upward 
change decreases. The predicted probabilities of activism in the first year in the organization are 
miniscule; by the fifth year, the likelihood exceeds the population (of group members) average. For 
occasional activists, after five years, additional time in the organization has almost no impact on the 
probability of contributing, while the likelihood of being a core activist continues to creep slightly 
upward. One possible explanation is that contributors learn about occasional activism more quickly. 
An alternative is that this discrepancy may reflect the fact that roughly the same number of members 
are entering the occasional activist group from the rank and file as leaving it to step up into the core 
cadre. Only a panel study, however, could actually test whether such a transition process is 
occurring. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
To summarize; Initial predispositions for activism are not the only reason why contributors 
volunteer. Costs and benefits are far more impressive predictors of activism, and they work in the 
expected directions. Activists are largely motivated by returns exclusive to activists. These findings 
are consistent with the experiential search perspective, if perhaps reconcileable with alternative 
scenarios of the activist process. What confirms the search perspective and falsifies contrasting 
frameworks is the finding that organizational experience is extremely important for the conditional 
decision process. 
Finally, perceptions of organizational oligarchy do not seem particularly important for 
activism. There is some slight evidence that such perceptions precipitate core activism (t = 1.4). If 
this result is valid, it implies that a tendency toward organizational conservatism may reflect a 
process in which those who believe that the association is oligarchic and that members of the rank 
and file are inefficacious get involved, while those who consider the association democratic stay out 
of the fray, ceteris paribus. If perceptions of oligarchy or internal democracy are correlated with 
normative beliefs in them-a leap of faith upon which this analysis can shed no light-then there 
will be a conservative bias built into the group process. 
18 
16 
14 
12 
PROBABILITY 
OF 10 
ACTIVISM 
(PERCENT) 
8 
6 
4 
2 
FIGURE 1:
PROBABILITY OF ACTIVISM AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
0-r---+�-+--+-�-4-��-1---4�-+-���� 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
EXPERIENCE 
(YEARS IN GROUP) 
Occasional 
Activists 
- Core 
Activists 
17 
Conclusions: Contributor Mobilization and Experiential Search 
The key issues of this analysis can be summarized by examining three questions: What 
motivates contributors who move up the organizational hierarchy? Is there a theoretical framework 
for conceptualizing activism specifically and citizen decision calculi in organizations generally? 
Can these theoretical and empirical findings shed any light on the assertion that "who says 
organization, says oligarchy" (Michels 1966, p. 365)? 
The archetypal image of an activist in a public regarding group such as Common Cause is of 
an idealist. The findings in this study dispute this belief. A seemingly perfect match between 
member and group will not precipitate activism; devotees to stated group goals, for example, are 
frequently willing to remain in the rank and file. 
Benefits that are broadly construed as exclusive to activism and organizational experience 
are fundamental. Those rewards that are the province of activists alone-conditioned by the 
differential costs involved-are more relevant than zealotry about organizational objectives. Career 
aspirations; the feeling that it is possible to have a large impact, either personally or through the 
organization, on the provision of collective goods; and solidary returns outstrip devotion to the cause 
in importance. Beyond these costs and benefits lies organizational experience, which diminishes the 
uncertainty surrounding activism. Few enter the group intent on becoming activists. Individuals 
join organizations and learn about them and then decide how to proceed. For those who conclude 
that the group is a suitable match-in terms of efficacy, personal advancement, interpersonal 
interactions, costs, and the like-activism may be the next step. After a few years, however, the 
impact of organizational experience fades. 
The activism calculus can be characterized as an experiential search process. Observed 
behavior bears out the theoretical expectation that imperfectly informed contributors initially 
separate themselves into two groups: those who become activists and then learn about its costs and 
benefi and the vast majority who wait and decide whether activism is worthwhile. Paying the $20 
annual dues and learning more about the net benefits of activism is generally a superior infonnation­
gathering strategy than incurring the high costs from the start. If contributors decide to stay in the 
rank and file for more than a few years, though, they are likely to remain there. 
Experiential search offers a general theoretical perspective for understanding citizens' 
decision calculi in organizations. Imperfectly informed individuals attempt to overcome their 
deficiencies in an optimal manner. This proposition is true whether the calculus involves the 
decision to join the association, to stay in it, or to become an activist, to name a few. 
Finally, is it true that who says organization, says oligarchy? The somewhat speculative 
answer to this question is that there may be a tendency toward oligarchy, but it is hardly an "iron 
law." Previous research may dispute the iron law of oligarchy because of an extreme simplifying 
assumption by those who have examined the issue that only whether a group is oligarchic matters for 
how the group functions.23 The present analysis indicates that the elite-assuming activists are 
partially representative-have a host of possible motivations including, but not limited to, self­
aggrandizement through acquisition of divisible benefits and the consumption of interpersonal 
interactions. 
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The efficacy of the organization and whether people care about it are also important to 
activists. Moreover, perceptions of oligarchy do not necessarily lead to activism even for those 
remaining in the group. These findings suggest that organizations are going to look less oligarchic 
than Michels suggested. An organization perceived to be unresponsive may be able to recruit some 
activists, but it probably is not feasible for an association such as Common Cause to obscure totally 
the group's stated goals. 
There is a crying need for additional data to explore further the assertions made in this 
analysis. Time series data, in particular, are required. Panel studies that follow both rank-and-file 
members and activists would be invaluable. Only then can the intertemporal paths that contributors 
take to and away from activism be unequivocably traced. Until additional data are collected, the 
findings in this analysis and other research that draws temporal conclusions from cross-sectional data 
must be accepted cautiously. 
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Notes 
I would like to thank Rod Kiewiet , Morgan Kousser , and Barbara Rothenberg for helpful 
comments and Jeffrey Dubin for econometric and programming assistance beyond the call of 
duty. Responsibility for all mistakes remains with the author. 
1. The Common Cause survey was conducted in the fall of 1981 by the political science
department of Stanford University. It was funded by grant SES-8105708 from the National
Science Foundation to Professor Heinz Eulau in support of research by Jonathan Siegel. Many
thanks to Mr. Siegel for generously furnishing these data to the author.
2. The spirit of this approach owes much to economic theories of search, although it differs from 
standard sequential models by emphasizing the importance of experience (for a general
overview of search theory, see Mortensen 1986).
3. Contributors ' responses to questions that tap their perceptions about having an impact on the
production of collective goods probably reflect their perceptions of the group's,  and not their
personal, impact on the provision of such benefits (Rothenberg 1987).
4. As will be discussed in more detail, the ideal means of studying activism would of course be
through a panel study, but such data are not currently available.
5. McFarland ( 1984) also distinguishes between activists and the occasionally active , but his
beliefs about the latter group are based on conjecture. In the present research, occasional
activists are defi as any respondent who was not designated by Common Cause as an activist
but who claimed to be (a) active in a Common Cause state organization; (b) active as a steering
committee coordinator in a congressional district; (c) active as a telephone network coordinator
or activator; (d) active as a telephone caller; (e) active as a speaker before other groups; or (:t)
involved in other activist activities. Rank and file members formed 69 percent of the stratified
sample; occasional activists, 8 percent; and core activists , 23 percent.
6 .  On the other hand, i t  is conceivable that those with lower incomes may garner more utility from 
a smaller monetary increment. 
7. There is some indication that those with political aspirations leave Common Cause for greener
pastures (Rothenberg 1987). The inference drawn is that most members decide that Common
Cause is a poor place for career advancement. The flip side of this story is that aspirants who
do believe that the organization is a good way to advance become activists.
8. These figures are based on an open-ended question asking respondents their principal reason for
joining. In reality,  many members gave several answers . As long as one response was broadly
participatory, the contributors were considered to have an initial predisposition toward activism.
Nevertheless, only 1 1  percent met this criterion.
9. Rather than asking how many years they have been activists, members were requested to
choose one of five categories : (a) 8-10 years, (b) 6-7 years, (c) 4-5 years, (d) 2-3 years, and (e)
1 year or less. The three-year estimate is conservative; it is based on the most years possible-
10, 7, 5 ,  3, or 1-that participants might have been involved relative to the number of years
they have been in the group. If the means of the above categories were substituted for the upper
bounds, less than 9 percent of activists would be classified as having become activists within
one year of joining.
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1 0. Income was measured with an eight-fold variable according to whether the respondent 's family 
income was: (a) under $10,000; (b) $10,000-$20,000; (c) $20,000-$25,000; (d) $25,000-
$35,000; (e) $35,000-$50,000; (t) $50,000-$75,000; (g) $75,000-$100,000; (h) over $ 100,000. 
Respondents ' income and wage rates would have been more appropriate, but these data were 
not furnished. Urban residence was measured using infoffilation from the Congressional 
District Data Book (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973). 
5 
1 1. Position agreement is measured as -l [L (X;p - X;a)2] ,  where X;p and X;c are , respectively,i=l 
contributors ' personal preferences and views of where Common Cause stands on the following 
issues: an amendment limiting government spending, sunset legislation, campaign finance 
laws, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and lobby disclosure laws. Leadership assessment 
is an additive index combining five-fold responses to questions about the legislative success of 
Common Cause and an explicit rating of how well the leadership and staff do their jobs. The 
efficacy measure vis-a-vis the group combines the responses to two parallel questions on how 
important to the success of Common Cause individuals think (a) their own contributions and (b) 
their own political activities are. The indicator of efficacy relative to the political system is an 
additive measure tapping whether respondents feel that they can (a) help get a law passed or 
defeated in Congress; (b) get people to contribute money to a political campaign; (c) persuade a 
local newspaper editor or reporter to give publicity to a worthwhile cause; and (d) state their 
views at a public hearing on some issues they care about. 
12. The foffiler is an additive index of the importance assigned to membership in Common Cause
as a means of (a) fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship, (b) supporting leaders like John 
Gardner and Archibald Cox, and (c) helping to ensure good government. Caring is an additive
scale of member interest in each of the five issues used to construct the position agreement
scale.
13. This is a five-fold response to a question on the importance contributors attribute to meeting 
interesting people and making new friends. 
14. Perceptions about oligarchy are tapped by combining contributors '  responses about whether (a)
members of Common Cause are given a large role in deteffilining its policies; (b) only a small
minority of members take part in Common Cause decision-making; (c) most members agree
with Common Cause positions; and (d) sometimes a small minority of members prevents
Common Cause from taking a position supported by the majority.
15. One-tailed significance tests are therefore utilized for all independent variables except the linear
learning teffil and perceptions of oligarchy.
16. If the real world probabilities are unknown, then-theoretically at least-there is a solution
developed by Manski and McFadden ( 198 1).
17. This constraint may also lead to some specification error. To test this, an analogue to the model
specification test developed by Hausman (Hausman 1978, Hausman and McFadden 1984) was
derived for the WES.ML estimator to help deteffiline whether Common Cause contributors
really make trichotomous choices with respect to activism. This exercise involved testing the
three-fold specification against the alternative of viewing the activist decision as a series of
dichotomous choices. Members initially decide whether or not to be active and subsequently
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select the degree of  commitment (occasional versus core). The results lead to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the slopes are equal. This finding suggests that the assumption 
concerning independence of irrelevant alternatives is being violated; the damage this causes to 
the derived estimates is uncertain. 
18. Data on changes in probabilities like those shown in Table 2 must always be seen as suggestive
rather than definitive. Table 2 serves as a rough guide for assessing the relative impacts of
different features on activism.
19. It would be ideal to have panel data that would permit the identification of those who became
activists immediately and then went back to the rank and file. 
20. An alternative way to think about costs might be largely in terms of time available for public
service. Individuals with fewer work and family obligations-those who are not in the labor
force or who have relatively undemanding jobs and who do not have children living at home­
might be more likely to have the time to be activists. Unfortunately, the Common Cause data
contain only information on marital status and not on family composition; also, they only report
job status and type of job rather than hours worked per week. When dummy variables for
marital and job status are incorporated into the previously estimated equation, the results tend to
disconfi this perspective on costs: Married individuals are actually more likely to be
activists, and job status is irrelevant.
It might also be speculated that Common Cause's dependence on telephone calls rather than 
face-to-face interactions might be less threatening than volunteering elsewhere and hence more 
appealing to older persons and women. To test this , the model was again rerun with a series of 
dummy variables tapping age groups and an additional dummy variable for sex. The results 
reveal that gender has no impact and that the effect of age is very erratic. 
2 1. This discussion refers to the assumption (Downs 1957) that citizens participate if the returns-­
the probability of having an impact times the accruing benefits-exceed the costs: 
R = PB - C , 
where R is the citizen's action (voting, becoming an activist), B is the potential benefit from the 
action, P is the probability that benefits will accrue if the action is taken, and C is the cost of 
taking the action. The unimportance of the potential benefits in the present analysis may reflect 
the homogeneity of Common Cause members. The dispersion of policy preferences is far 
greater among the American electorate than among the universe of associational members. 
22. These numbers are based on changes in the probabilities of activism as a result of simultaneous
shifts in the values of the linear and logarithmic measures of organizational experience; they are
not shown in Table 2.
23. For others, perceptions of oligarchy may prompt departure. When a previously specified model
of member exit (Rothenberg 1987) was reestimated with oligarchy included, feelings that the
group is oligarchic were found to be positively related to quitting (t = 1.8). Membership
experience may lead to the same evaluation but result in different reactions : Some exit and
others become active in organizations they believe are oligarchic.
22 
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